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Backlash in Bolivia: Regional Autonomy as a
Reaction against Indigenous Mobilization
KENT EATON
In the 1990s, Bolivia’s indigenous population mobilized to claim new political
roles, and in the process, directly challenged the privileged position of economic
elites within national political institutions. In response, business associations in
Santa Cruz, Bolivia’s most prosperous region, began to demand regional auton-
omy—in contrast to the demand for authoritarianism that characterized prior
generations of business elites when confronted with threatening political change.
After examining Santa Cruz’ past relationship with the national government, this
article explores the challenges that led economic elites in the department to seek
autonomy and the strategies that they have adopted in pursuit of this goal.
Keywords: regional autonomy; indigenous mobilization; decentralization;
business associations; Bolivia
In recent years, parts of Latin America have witnessed a remarkable transfor-
mation according to which long-excluded indigenous people have mobilized to
play fundamentally new roles in national political systems. The transformation is
ongoing, but it has already produced a number of significant changes. Examples
include the revision of constitutions to assert the multiethnic nature of the state,1
the emergence of indigenous parties,2 and the sharp increase in organizational
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activity along ethnic rather than class lines.3 Not unlike the incorporation of labor,
which proved to be the crucial political juncture of the twentieth century, the
mobilization of indigenous Latin Americans represents what could be for many
countries the most pivotal political event of the current century.
While imperfect, this parallel between indigenous mobilization in the contem-
porary period and the earlier incorporation of labor unions is a productive one to
explore. Just as the regionwide process of labor incorporation played out differ-
ently in distinct countries,4 so the common process of indigenous mobilization has
generated important differences across national borders.5 The historical parallel
with labor incorporation also suggests, however, that it is not enough to study
cross-national variation in how indigenous people are organizing. Equally press-
ing is the need to analyze how established elites respond to the emergence of
actors who were previously marginalized within the political system. Enough time
has now elapsed since the onset of the current period of indigenous mobilization
to begin to assess more systematically forms of backlash by actors who feel
threatened by the political emergence of indigenous groups.
In the twentieth century, economic elites were profoundly threatened by cer-
tain patterns of labor incorporation, particularly when radical political parties
served as the agents of incorporation in periods of democratic rule.6 In many
countries, these elites responded by throwing their support behind military gov-
ernments in the hopes that authoritarianism would check or reverse political
advances by labor. The importance of the backlash against labor incorporation
in the previous century begs the question of how today’s political and economic
elites are reacting to indigenous mobilization. The question is particularly inter-
esting because compared to most of the twentieth century, authoritarianism as a
political option now receives far less support from a broad set of internal and
external actors—despite manifest failures in the consolidation of democracy.
Given that democratization has facilitated the recent gains made by indigenous
groups,7 some established elites who are threatened by these “new” groups may
well prefer an authoritarian solution. Unlike in the past, however, they would
face significant obstacles in promoting such a solution in contemporary Latin
America. In this article, I argue that it is the pursuit of regional autonomy rather
than authoritarianism that has defined the elite response to indigenous mobi-
lization in one particularly important case: Bolivia.8
Nowhere in Latin America is the newfound political salience of indigenous
actors more pronounced than in Bolivia, the country with the highest percent-
age of people who identify as indigenous in the region.9 Within the past fifteen
years, indigenous Bolivians have penetrated into important decision-making
arenas in both municipal and national governments. At the municipal level,
decentralization in 1994 gave local indigenous communities a degree of inde-
pendence from established political parties that they had never before enjoyed,
which proved to be critical in the growth of new indigenous parties, including
72 POLITICS & SOCIETY
 © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on July 3, 2008 http://pas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
most importantly the now governing party, Movimiento al Socialismo
(Movement toward Socialism, or MAS). Increasingly, indigenous groups have
also come to exercise greater political protagonism at the national level because
of a complex series of events that includes the withdrawal of corporatist protec-
tions,10 the cumulative effects of municipal decentralization, and the migration
to La Paz and El Alto of indigenous workers displaced by the collapse of min-
eral exports.11 By 2003, indigenous groups achieved sufficient political power to
begin to veto national governments they perceived to be acting against their
interests. This is precisely what happened with the eviction of President
Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada in October of that year over his attempt to increase
exports of natural gas, and this is what happened again in June 2005 against his
successor, Carlos Mesa, who refused to support the nationalization of the gas
industry. Six months later, the remarkable political transformation of Bolivia’s
indigenous population culminated in the victory of Evo Morales by a twenty-
five point margin in the December 2005 presidential election.
Faced with the rapid and dramatic constriction of their ability to shape polit-
ical events in Bolivia, powerful economic elites have reacted by demanding
autonomy for the country’s regional or “departmental” level of government. The
demand for autonomy is particularly acute in the eastern lowland department of
Santa Cruz, which occupies a third of the national territory and is home to the
country’s most productive economic activities and most well-organized busi-
ness associations. Grouped together in the Pro-Santa Cruz Committee (Comité
Pro-Santa Cruz, or CPSC) that they finance and control, these business associ-
ations are directly threatened by the antimarket sentiment that indigenous polit-
ical groups in the highlands have so successfully harnessed. Since the critical
2002 presidential and legislative elections, they are also threatened by the seri-
ous electoral difficulties of the traditional political parties on which they previ-
ously depended to represent their interests in the national government. To use
Hirschman’s language, “exit” has emerged as a much more attractive option to
economic elites in Santa Cruz with the muting of the “voice” they previously
enjoyed in La Paz.12
But who exactly are the “economic elites” of Santa Cruz, and what specifi-
cally do they understand by the term regional autonomy? For all of the nine-
teenth century and half of the twentieth century, Santa Cruz elites were owners
of agricultural plantations that used forms of debt peonage to produce goods for
regional markets, and in a much more limited fashion, for the national market
to the west.13 Beginning in the 1950s, however, these traditional haciendas were
replaced with modern and increasingly extensive agrobusinesses that produce
sugar, wheat, cotton, soy, and beef for both national and export markets.14
Although Bolivia in the wake of its 1952 Revolution experienced one of Latin
America’s most significant land reform programs, land redistribution on a
significant scale occurred only in the western departments.15 As a result, land
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ownership in Santa Cruz has remained highly concentrated among a small elite
that holds vast tracts of land.16 With the boom in Santa Cruz’ economy that
began in the 1970s, agricultural elites began to invest their earnings in financial,
industrial, and service sector activities.17 Despite this diversification into nona-
gricultural activities, however, agriculture remains the dominant activity of
Santa Cruz’ economic elite, which as a class is committed to the defense of a
highly concentrated pattern of land tenure. To operationalize the term economic
elite, I focus in this article on the leaders of Santa Cruz’ five most influential
business associations, each of which is dominated by large-scale rather than
small- or medium-scale operations.18
Because of significant differences of opinion within Santa Cruz over the
meaning of regional autonomy, it is also important at the outset to clarify what
this term means. For some, autonomy means direct elections for regional politi-
cal authorities, a form of political decentralization that has recently been
debated and/or adopted in other unitary countries in Latin America, including
Chile and Colombia.19 For the leaders of Santa Cruz’ business associations,
however, autonomy goes far beyond the holding of elections to include (1)
regional control over natural resources (e.g., land, timber, gas, and oil),20 (2) the
right to retain control over two-thirds of all tax revenues generated in the depart-
ment,21 and (3) authority to set all policies other than defense, currency, tariffs,
and foreign relations.22 In other words, Santa Cruz’ economic elites seek a rad-
ical form of autonomy that would far exceed anything granted in the recent
wave of decentralization in Latin America, dramatically raising the stakes of this
autonomy struggle for Bolivia and for Santa Cruz. Given the concentration of
wealth and productive activities in Santa Cruz, this form of autonomy would
significantly constrain the redistributive capacity of Bolivia’s central govern-
ment.23 But such a radical form of autonomy would also be negative for nonelite
actors in Santa Cruz if it were to come in the absence of equity-enhancing
reforms in the department. Considering the greater leverage that progressive
political forces now exert at the national level, these reforms are much more
likely in a centralized Bolivia than in an autonomous Santa Cruz.
To demonstrate how the demand for regional autonomy operates as a reac-
tion against indigenous mobilization, this article proceeds as follows. The first
section places regional departments within the context of Bolivia’s political and
economic geography. The next section analyzes the historic relationship
between Santa Cruz and the national government and demonstrates how cen-
tralized institutions served dominant economic interests in the department for
decades. In the third section, I discuss the developments in the past decade—
including the traumatic overthrow of Sánchez de Losada and the interim Mesa
government—that gave economic elites in Santa Cruz both cause and opportu-
nity to push for departmental autonomy. The fourth section describes the
response by leaders of Santa Cruz’ business associations to the events of the past
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decade. According to my argument, business groups have successfully reframed
their narrow sectoral demands as broader territorial demands through the adop-
tion of three related strategies. First, the leaders of sector-specific business asso-
ciations have overcome their sectoral differences and united around their
common class interests in response to the threats they now face from Bolivia’s
mobilized indigenous population. Second, in addition to unifying as a regional
class, Santa Cruz’ elites provoked a rupture with their class counterparts else-
where in Bolivia by withdrawing from the national business association. Third,
Santa Cruz business leaders sought to co-opt nonelite groups in the department
in the attempt to deflect criticism that their autonomy demands are designed
merely to protect their own personal economic interests. The final section con-
cludes by summarizing the key conditions under which indigenous mobilization
generated the autonomista backlash in Bolivia, most of which do not appear to
be present in other countries whose indigenous populations have also begun to
mobilize along ethnic lines.
REGIONAL DEPARTMENTS IN THE POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF THE NATION
Subnational regionalism has a long history in Bolivia. Governed during the
Spanish colonial period as the Audiencia de Charcas, the territory of present-
day Bolivia was divided into four large intendencias: Chuquisaca, La Paz,
Potosí, and Santa Cruz. Each intendencia became a department on indepen-
dence, and out of these existing departments, five additional departments were
subsequently carved: Cochabamba (1825), Oruro (1826), Tarija (1826), Beni
(1842), and Litoral (1867). The department of the Litoral, along with Bolivia’s
coastal access, was lost to Chile in the War of the Pacific in 1881, and an addi-
tional department (Pando) was carved out of the Beni in 1938. Thus, for the past
seven decades, Bolivia has been divided into nine regional departments, five in
the mountainous western part of the country and four in what is known as the
media luna, or crescent-shaped area that curves around the foothills of the
Andes in the northern, eastern, and southeastern lowlands.
According to José Luis Roca, the history of Bolivia is the history of regional
struggle and not class struggle as Marxist historians have consistently argued.24
The most important regional struggle of the late nineteenth century was the so-
called guerra federal (federal war) between Chiquisaca, which was then losing
hegemony because of the collapse of the silver economy, and La Paz, which suc-
cessfully rode the tin boom to secure a preeminent position among Bolivian
regions. When La Paz–based economic elites won this civil war in 1899, they
proceed to construct a state that sharply centralized political and economic
authority in the national government. Regions that previously enjoyed much
political independence were henceforth governed by prefects who served at the
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pleasure of the chief executive of the national government. Fifty years after the
conclusion of the federal war, the logic of Bolivia’s 1952 revolution produced a
new spate of centralizing changes that accentuated even further the political and
functional dependence of regional departments on the center. For example, the
party that led the revolution and took control of the national government—the
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, or MNR—used that control to sup-
press elections for mayor in the nine departmental capitals. Although these were
restored in 1985, Bolivia ended the twentieth century as one of Latin America’s
most centralized countries, with intermediate-level governments that were
among the weakest in the region.
The MNR’s suppression of elections in departmental capitals after the revolu-
tion also helps explain one of the most distinctive features of Bolivian civil soci-
ety: the salience of comités cívicos (civic committees) and movimientos cívicos
(civic movements) that are specific to each department.25 The elimination of
municipal elections in departmental capitals in the 1950s closed an important offi-
cial space for contestation among regional elites and created a major impetus for
the thickening of these unofficial, regional civil society organizations.26 Santa
Cruz was the first department to create a civic committee, which was begun by
counter-revolutionary university students who were affiliated with the proto-
fascist Falange Socialista Boliviana (Bolivian Socialist Falange, or FSB) and who
used the committee to foment resistance to the ultimately victorious forces of the
MNR.27 While the resistance failed, the Pro-Santa Cruz Committee (CPSC) not
only survived but thrived in the following decade, quickly becoming an organiza-
tional model for civic committees in other departments.28 When the period of
MNR rule came to an end with the military coup of 1964, the resulting repression
of political society at the national level threw into even greater relief the vibrancy
of these departmental civic committees. This history is important because it helps
account for the legitimacy that the CPSC has been able to claim in leading Santa
Cruz’ current struggle for regional autonomy.
Turning from political to economic geography, Bolivia’s boom and bust
cycles have consistently produced major distributive conflicts between its con-
stituent departments. Throughout the country’s history, what has remained
unchanged is the heavy dependence of the economy on natural resources.
Despite this continuity, the identity of the leading commodity has changed
through time, and each commodity shift has generated tensions between
regional winners and losers. In the late nineteenth century, for instance, the tin
boom led to the construction of railways from the department of La Paz through
the department of Oruro to Pacific ports in Chile and Peru, severely displacing
agricultural goods from the department of Santa Cruz and marginalizing it from
the national economy for decades. While the shift from silver to tin favored one
western department (La Paz) over another (Chuquisaca), the subsequent col-
lapse of mineral exports and the rise of agro-export activities in the 1970s and
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’80s led to the decline of western departments relative to the departments of the
media luna.29 As a result of this latest regional shift, by 2000, Santa Cruz, with
less than a quarter of the population, produced 40 percent of the country’s
export revenue and 42 percent of its tax revenue.30 Considering these figures, the
stakes for Bolivia of Santa Cruz’ drive for autonomy are high indeed.
SANTA CRUZ AND THE PRACTICE OF CENTRALISM
Santa Cruz is currently the site of the loudest and most trenchant criticisms
of the centralism that has pervaded Bolivia’s political structure for decades. In
the past, however, Bolivian centralism very much operated in ways that pro-
moted regional economic development in Santa Cruz. The purpose of this
section is twofold: first to document the past political influence of Santa Cruz
elites in the highly centralized institutions of the national government and sec-
ond to demonstrate that the assistance of national officials in La Paz was crucial
to the department’s development. Evidence of the significant gains that Santa
Cruz elites previously derived from a highly centralized system of government
is significant because it focuses our attention on how the events discussed in the
next section—namely indigenous mobilization at the national and municipal
levels beginning in the 1990s—convinced elites in the department of the need
to push for autonomy.
A brief survey of Bolivia’s political history suggests that in the decades
before the autonomy movement emerged in Santa Cruz, elites in the department
either exerted substantial influence in the national government or provided crit-
ical support for its overthrow and replacement with a more compliant set of
national leaders.31 In the nearly two decades of military-led government in
Bolivia (1964–1982), for example, the imprint of Santa Cruz’ influence is quite
clear. In 1964, the CPSC applauded the coup by General René Barrientos
against the MNR government, which it had fought for years and which had
forced the committee to close down in the late 1950s and early ’60s.32 Barrientos
rewarded Santa Cruz with concessionary loans and named several individuals
from the CPSC to high-level positions in his government.33 Santa Cruz elites
were much less pleased with the subsequent and left-leaning military govern-
ment of Juan José Torres, who proposed the nationalization of the Santa
Cruz–based sugar industry and who refused to repress land invasions by
colonists in Santa Cruz. Not only did Santa Cruz elites play the leading role in
the coup against Torres, but Hugo Banzer was selected as president by the coup
makers because of the support he enjoyed among the agricultural and industrial
elite of Santa Cruz.34 Under the rule of Banzer (1971–78), who was a native of
Santa Cruz, the political influence of cruceño elites reached its zenith.
The difficult transition from military-led government to democracy in
Bolivia also reveals the significant influence that departmental actors in Santa
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Cruz enjoyed in the national government. In the early 1980s, agricultural inter-
ests in Santa Cruz began to oppose the military dictatorship of General Luis
García Meza, whose narco-trafficking operations were driving up the cost of
labor in legal agricultural activities in the department.35 In his role as President,
García Meza responded by attempting to reorganize and hence control the
CPSC and by attempting to bolster his support in La Paz through the construc-
tion there of a large sugar mill that Santa Cruz had opposed. The CPSC in turn
reacted with a series of civic strikes (paros cívicos) that ultimately led to García
Meza’s ouster.36 The transition to democracy, however, did not necessarily solve
the problems of Santa Cruz elites. Opposed to the leftist economic policies of
the first president elected in the postauthoritarian period (Hernán Siles Suazo,
1982–85), the CPSC returned to regional strike activity in the successful attempt
to hold early elections and cut short his tenure as president. Thus, throughout
the political volatility of the 1960s, ’70s, and ’80s, support for either a change
of government or change of regime in La Paz—rather than demands for auton-
omy from La Paz—was the consistent response by Santa Cruz elites to national
governments they did not like.
In addition to the political weight that Santa Cruz enjoyed at the national
level, it is also the case that the department derived significant economic bene-
fits from the national government. Within Santa Cruz, there are two central
tenets in the dominant view of how the department shed its marginal status circa
1950 and became the chief motor of the national economy by the last quarter of
the twentieth century. First is the belief that the absence and neglect of the cen-
tral state encouraged the growth of an unfettered free market in Santa Cruz, in
contrast to the state capitalism that obtained elsewhere in Bolivia.37 Second is
the belief that the financing of public infrastructure in the department came
exclusively from royalties produced by Santa Cruz’ own oil reserves. There is
some truth in both beliefs, and yet, a fuller examination of the available data
demonstrates additional mechanisms through which the national government
helped create the department’s developmental “miracle.”
Most important is the reality that the national government funneled to Santa
Cruz the bulk of the aid monies and concessionary loans that it acquired from
the United States government. Between 1938 and 1948, for instance, nearly the
entirety of Bolivia’s external debt went into development projects in Santa
Cruz.38 Critical in this respect is the war-time mission to Bolivia by the United
States State Department in 1941, which proposed the diversification of the
Bolivian economy away from mineral exports and which advocated the
so-called “March to the East” (Marcha hacia el oriente). As recommended in
the Plan Bohan that resulted from this mission, Bolivia created the Corporación
Boliviana de Fomento in 1942, which financed the construction of a highway
from Cochabamba to Santa Cruz that was completed in 1954. Along with the
1960 completion of railway connections to the Amazon and Rio de la Plata river
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systems, also financed by the national government with external assistance,
these infrastructure projects ended the isolation of Santa Cruz from national and
international markets.39
A pro–Santa Cruz bias in the investment decisions of the national govern-
ment is even more pronounced in the government of Hugo Banzer, who manu-
factured a government-induced economic boom in his home department.40
According to Conaghan and Malloy, Santa Cruz agrobusinesses received 66 per-
cent of the agricultural credit extended under Banzer by Bolivia’s Agricultural
Bank (Banco Agrícola de Bolivia [BAB]), whose lax collection policy resulted
in its bankruptcy by 1979.41 In other words, not only did Santa Cruz receive the
bulk of the credits, but in large part, the loans received by agricultural enter-
prises in the department were never repaid. According to James Dunkerley,
Santa Cruz “family firms such as Gasser-Bowles, Bedoya, Súarez, Said and
Elsner . . . and the influential Banco Santa Cruz de la Sierra . . . soaked up
large quantities of government loans, considerably enhancing their economic
and political power.”42 In an additional move that benefited Santa Cruz and
penalized consumers in western departments, the BAB set agricultural prices to
ensure that farmers’ production costs were covered.43 Thanks in part to these
preferential policies, economic growth in Santa Cruz far outpaced growth rates
for the national economy for most of the Banzer period, as seen in Table 1.
Finally, in the years since its boom began in the 1970s, the Santa Cruz econ-
omy also reaped disproportionate benefits from the imposition by the central
government of one of Latin America’s most ambitious and consistent programs
of economic liberalization. The adoption of market-friendly and pro-export eco-
nomic policies had a strongly negative impact in the western part of the coun-
try, where the producers of nontradable goods dominated, and a very positive
impact in the east, where the bulk of the country’s exports are located. To
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Table 1
Economic Growth Rates in Bolivia and Santa Cruz: 1971–197844
Year Bolivia Santa Cruz
1971 4.94% 9.46%
1972 5.75% 7.42%
1973 6.82% 12.81%
1974 6.10% 5.00%
1975 5.08% 6.65%
1976 6.82% 9.90%
1977 3.41% 5.10%
1978 3.12% 0.35%
Average
1971–78 5.25% 7.08%
 © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on July 3, 2008 http://pas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
overcome opposition to these policies by Bolivia’s powerful labor confederation,
policy-making authority in the period after 1985 was strongly concentrated in
the office of the president, who used a state of siege and other centralizing mea-
sures to impose economic liberalization.45 This period offers yet another
example of how centralism, used in the 1980s and ’90s in the service of neolib-
eralism, redounded to the benefit of Santa Cruz elites.
LOSING VOICE: MUNICIPAL AND NATIONAL CHALLENGES
TO ELITES IN SANTA CRUZ
Considering the history surveyed in the previous section, the continued prac-
tice of centralism in Bolivia may well have continued to favor Santa Cruz eco-
nomically and to allow elites in that department disproportionate political
influence in the national government. Beginning in the mid-1990s, however,
Bolivia began to experience a series of major transformations at the municipal
and national levels that directly threatened economic elites in Santa Cruz. The
following paragraphs analyze these changes to substantiate the threat that they
posed to established elites. To highlight the perception in Santa Cruz that this
threat was becoming more significant with the passage of time, the discussion
proceeds in chronological order, beginning with the first administration of
Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada (1993–1997) and ending with the aborted adminis-
tration of Carlos Mesa (2003–2005).
Although it appears contradictory, the first major threat to Santa Cruz elites
in this period was the adoption of two decentralizing laws in 1994 and 1995.
This seeming contradiction is explained by the political reality that President
Sánchez de Losada enacted decentralization to the municipal level expressly in
the attempt to keep regional authority limited.46 Sánchez de Losada believed that
decentralization to the regional level would lead to the fragmentation of the
country and regularly referred to the contemporaneous breakup of Yugoslavia to
make his point.47 In a design process that involved little consultation outside the
executive branch,48 the President endorsed the creation of more than three hun-
dred brand-new municipalities and the introduction of sizable automatic trans-
fers to these municipalities to make them independent of departmental
authorities.49 The municipal bent of the 1994 law infuriated defenders of the
regional departments, who saw regions and not municipalities as the only sub-
national unit with any historical resonance in Bolivia.50 Subsequently, the equa-
tion of decentralization with municipalization encouraged the Pro-Santa Cruz
Committee to embrace “autonomy” as its goal and to dismiss “decentralization”
as something that had already taken place in Bolivia.51
Sánchez de Losada’s hostility toward the departments was also apparent in
the Law of Administrative Decentralization that he successfully introduced the
following year. Despite its labeling as a decentralization measure, in fact, the
80 POLITICS & SOCIETY
 © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on July 3, 2008 http://pas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
law represented a step backward with respect to greater departmental authority.
Most importantly, this 1995 law amended the 1967 constitution, which had
called for the conversion of departments from mere administrative units into
actual governments with their own directly elected representative assemblies
(asambleas departamentales).52 The 1995 law downgraded these assemblies to
mere councils (concejos departamentales), which would be indirectly elected
by municipal councils, and stipulated that departmental authorities would serve
not as leaders of their own governments but rather as representatives of the
national executive branch at the regional level (poder ejecutivo a nivel
regional).53 Thus, while the law strengthened the role of the regions in adminis-
tering nationally determined policies, it erased from the constitution the possi-
bility of direct elections for regional authorities.54
This mix of municipal decentralization and departmental centralization was
troubling to economic elites in Santa Cruz for a number of reasons. To begin
with, the fact that municipal governments now enjoyed sizable and automatic
revenue transfers direct from La Paz gave added political significance to the
success of new indigenous parties in municipal elections in the late 1990s. The
national emergence of Evo Morales’ Movimiento al Socialismo after 2000 was
facilitated by the multiple victories his party lined up in the municipalities of the
Chapare, the coca-growing zone in the department of Cochabamba.55 Municipal
victories in the western departments of La Paz and Oruro were similarly impor-
tant in the strengthening of Felipe Quispe’s Movimiento Indigena Pachakuti
(Pachakuti Indigenous Movement, or MIP). Furthermore, the 1994 Law of
Popular Participation innovated not just by shifting revenues to municipal gov-
ernments but by creating new mechanisms for the participation of indigenous
civil society at the municipal level. Thus, even where the country’s three estab-
lished parties continued to win elections for municipal councilors and to govern
as mayors, the 1994 law created oversight committees (comités de vigilancia)
that were composed exclusively of territorial base communities and that had the
power to oversee the budgetary decisions of these municipal officials.56 In
effect, municipal decentralization created political training opportunities for
indigenous leaders all over Bolivia.57 As Moira Zuazo argues, “by challenging
the circulation of traditional elites at the municipal level, the LPP changed the
face of this country.”58
After the passage of the Popular Participation Law in 1994, the return of Santa
Cruz’ own Hugo Banzer to the presidency in 1997—this time as the result of
democratic elections—seemed to give elites in the department reason to celebrate.
Banzer had been openly critical of municipalization and issued several decrees in
the late 1990s that had the effect of constraining the fiscal independence of munic-
ipalities.59 Banzer, however, failed to provide an effective response to the major
social upheavals that defined his second presidency, and this weakness was cause
for growing alarm among Santa Cruz elites—despite the favoritism Banzer had
KENT EATON 81
 © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on July 3, 2008 http://pas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
shown them in the past.60 Most important are the two widespread social protests
that took place in 2000: the so-called guerra del agua (water war) in April and the
events of septiembre negro (Black September) five months later. In the water war,
indigenous groups, antimarket activists, and environmentalists coordinated a suc-
cessful mobilization against a subsidiary of the Bechtel Corporation, which then
decided to abandon its bid to supply water to Cochabamba.61 Santa Cruz elites
were disturbed by the forced eviction of a major international investor as well as
by the renewal of violence in September that saw a coordinated set of blockades
by Morales’ MAS and Quispe’s MIP in protest against Banzer’s draconian United
States–backed coca eradication efforts.
In this generalized environment of growing political and social turbulence, the
June 2002 elections generated additional cause for concern among elites in Santa
Cruz. First, although by law, Congress should have used the results of the 2000
census to grant additional legislative seats to Santa Cruz, whose population had
surged because of migration from the west, legislators from western departments
vetoed any such changes.62 This fight over seats (escaños), which returned in a
more virulent form in the run-up to the 2005 elections, exacerbated fears among
cruceño elites that they could no longer count on adequate representation in the
national government.63 The second and more important factor in the 2002 elec-
tions was the inferior performance of Bolivia’s traditional parties, including, most
notably, the virtual disappearance of Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN) in
the wake of Banzer’s death in May.64 The combined vote for the three traditional
parties (e.g., ADN, MIR, MNR) declined from 57 percent in 1997 to 42 percent
in 2002.65 Because of the fragmentation of the vote, Sánchez de Losada’s MNR
was still able to secure the presidency in 2002 but without the support of an effec-
tive interparty pact of the sort that had sustained past democratic governments.
Third and most important of all was Evo Morales’ stunning second-place finish in
the presidential election and the strong showing of his MAS party with twenty
percent of the vote in the legislative election, which earned the party significant
representation in Congress.66 Thanks largely to the performance of the MAS, the
number of indigenous legislators in Congress after the 2002 elections increased
tenfold relative to the previous legislature.67
Although Sánchez de Losada’s subnational reforms in 1994 and 1995 gener-
ated opposition from the CPSC, Santa Cruz elites strongly supported most of the
economic reforms he had introduced in the 1990s and very much preferred him
to Morales as president in 2002.68 Sánchez de Losada, however, was able to
complete only fifteen months of his second term, which did much to convince
elites that Bolivia’s political system was experiencing profound change and that
the high levels of governability achieved in the post-1985 period were at an end.
Perhaps worse, it was opposition to the neoliberal economic policies so faith-
fully implemented in Bolivia for the previous decade and a half that fueled the
devastating protests against Sánchez de Losada. In February 2003, thirty-three
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people died in protests and lootings in La Paz and El Alto over tax reform pro-
posals that were designed to close the budget deficit. Eight months later, in the
so-called guerra del gas (gas war), nearly sixty people died when Sánchez de
Losada called in the military to control protests over his proposal to build a new
pipeline for the export of natural gas. Amid invitations from Santa Cruz busi-
ness elites that he transfer the national capital to Santa Cruz, Sánchez de Losada
resigned the presidency on October 17, 2003, triggering a statement by the
CPSC that “it now doubted whether Santa Cruz would stay within Bolivia.”69
With the overthrow of Sánchez de Losada, for the first time since the transi-
tion to democracy more than two decades earlier, the Bolivian presidency was
no longer occupied by one of the country’s three established parties (ADN,
MIR, and MNR). While it was Congress that chose Carlos Mesa to finish out
Sánchez de Losada’s term, Mesa ascended to the presidency in October 2003
without any partisan support in the legislature. In response, the new president
sought to bolster his authority by constructing an extra-congressional alliance
with the MAS and by engaging in direct negotiations with Morales. According
to Vladimir Ameller, “negotiations between Mesa and Morales at the national
level were much more troubling to Santa Cruz’ elites than efforts by Sánchez de
Losada in the 1990s to draw in indigenous groups at the municipal level.”70
From the standpoint of Santa Cruz’ business leaders, Morales was not yet pres-
ident, but he was now exerting substantial influence on the chief executive.71
Mesa’s dialogue with Morales was particularly threatening because no repre-
sentatives of Santa Cruz’ powerful agricultural sector were invited into the pres-
idential cabinet—for the first time since the transition to democracy in 1982.
SEEKING EXIT: AUTONOMY AS A RESPONSE TO INDIGENOUS MOBILIZATION
The cumulative effect of the changes described above has been to displace
economic elites in Santa Cruz from the preeminent position they enjoyed in the
national political system. Worse, from the standpoint of these elites, is the real-
ity that these changes cannot be easily reversed; rather, they appear to constrict
for the foreseeable future the channels of influence on which elites have long
depended. Particularly at the national level, the meteoric rise of the MAS—in a
party system in which no single party in the post-1982 period was ever able to
win a majority—signifies a deep challenge to elite interests in Santa Cruz.
Whereas the fragmentation of Bolivia’s party system forced all presidents in the
contemporary democratic period to negotiate interparty pacts in order to gov-
ern,72 the emergence of the MAS as a majority party after 2002 means that
Morales does not need to negotiate with any traditional parties.73 As a result,
economic elites in Santa Cruz do not perceive their loss of voice in the national
government to be a temporary matter and believe instead that the defense of
their interests now requires some sort of autonomy from that government.
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Although at the time of this writing, the drive for regional autonomy in
Bolivia is not yet complete, advocates of a more autonomous Santa Cruz
achieved impressive gains in the three years that followed the October 2003
overthrow of Sánchez de Losada’s second government. Of great importance are
the two days in June 2004 and January 2005 when hundreds of thousands of
cruceños answered the call issued by the CPSC to demonstrate on behalf of
autonomy for Santa Cruz. More than 350,000 people participated in the second
of these events, the so-called Second Great Open Town Hall (Segundo Gran
Cabildo Abierto), which made it Bolivia’s largest-ever public demonstration.74
Subsequent to this second and larger rally in January 2005, the “Agenda of
January” came into use as shorthand in Bolivia to describe Santa Cruz’ auton-
omy movement, in contrast to the “Agenda of October (2003),” which refers to
the leftist movement that ousted Sánchez de Losada. In the period between these
two demonstrations, the CPSC collected approximately 500,000 signatures in
support of a referendum on autonomy and led a civic strike in November 2004
in the attempt to force the national government to hold this referendum.75 In
addition to protests and strikes, the CPSC also unilaterally moved to create a
departmental assembly, which is not allowed within Bolivia’s constitution, and
symbolically declared its own president as governor of Santa Cruz in January
2005.76 These behaviors provoked a strong response from the military, with a
warning by Armed Forces Commander Marco Antonio Justiniano in June 2005
that any unilateral declaration of autonomy would be considered a breach of the
constitution.77
The mobilizational capacity and disruptive tactics of the CPSC worked, how-
ever, in the sense that they forced the central government to agree to two sets of
elections. First, in response to CPSC pressure, the beleaguered interim President
Carlos Mesa agreed in April 2005 to institute elections for regional prefects.78
In these elections, held jointly with the presidential and legislative elections of
December 2005, Santa Cruz elected wealthy landowner and former CPSC
President Ruben Costas as prefect of the department. Second, and more impor-
tantly, in the unsuccessful attempt to appease Santa Cruz and hold on to his job,
Mesa subsequently agreed in June 2005 to hold a nationwide referendum on
departmental autonomy.79 While a majority of Bolivians (56 percent) rejected
regional autonomy in this referendum held on July 2, 2006, 71 percent of vot-
ers in Santa Cruz voted in favor of autonomy. Evo Morales campaigned against
the referendum but pledged that his party would respect the results in Santa
Cruz and initiate a debate on autonomy in the constitutional assembly that was
elected on the same day as the autonomy referendum.
How were the advocates of autonomy able to advance their agenda so suc-
cessfully and in such a compressed period of time? After all, their struggle for
autonomy has faced a number of significant political hurdles. Most obviously,
precisely because established elites have lost much of their influence within
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both the executive and legislative branches of the national government, they no
longer control the offices that would design, legislate, and oversee the devolu-
tion of policy authority to the departmental level. In the words of national
deputy José Bailaba (MAS, Santa Cruz), “the oligarchs in this department could
have used their control of the national government to adopt autonomy, but they
didn’t need autonomy when they dominated national institutions. Now they
need autonomy to protect their economic privileges, but can’t just adopt it
because they no longer control the government.”80
Unwilling or unable to introduce greater autonomy when they enjoyed influ-
ence in the national government, economic elites are now forced to push for
autonomy as a pressure group outside that government. A major obstacle to their
efforts is the widespread perception that they are merely seeking to defend their
own specific economic interests.81 To counter this perception, economic elites
have sought to repackage their narrow sectoral demands as broader geographic
or territorial demands. As I argue below, business elites have pursued this strat-
egy in three separate dimensions that are related but analytically distinct. First,
the threats posed by indigenous mobilization have encouraged different busi-
ness sectors to downplay their sectoral differences in the attempt to more fully
leverage their power as owners of capital. Second, even as they closed ranks
across economic sectors, Santa Cruz’ business groups have broken ranks with
La Paz–based economic elites, a rupture that enables them to claim that they are
defending Santa Cruz from the center. Third, business groups have sought to
construct cross-class alliances with nonelite actors in Santa Cruz, many of
whom have consequently come to endorse the vision of autonomy that has been
articulated by business leaders.
Closing Ranks across Business Sectors within Santa Cruz
According to the literature on business politics in Latin America, threats to
private property often encourage business groups to alter their strategies and
institutional preferences. For Jeffrey Frieden, such threats encourage different
economic sectors to overlook the policy differences that otherwise divide them
to defeat collectively those proposals that would disadvantage capital owners as
a class.82 In Ben Ross Schneider’s work on the origin and evolution of business
associations, threats to private property in Latin America’s past have enabled
previously fragmented business associations to construct and strengthen econ-
omy-wide umbrella associations.83 Both of these dynamics are clearly at play in
Santa Cruz, where separate business associations have closed ranks to mount a
vigorous defense of the property rights they have acquired within the depart-
ment, all in response to the perceived weakening of respect for property rights
in La Paz. Threats to private property and antimarket rhetoric emanating from
the national executive branch are not new in Bolivia, as demonstrated by the
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Torres and Siles Suazo administrations discussed earlier. What is new is the fact
that these threats are now coming from a political leader—Evo Morales—who
does not share with traditional business leaders the same ethnic identity, and
whose political campaigns have consistently accused market reforms of dispro-
portionately benefiting Bolivia’s nonindigenous minority.
In contrast to past regional economic booms in Bolivia, Santa Cruz’ eco-
nomic dominance since the 1970s is based on a relatively large number of dif-
ferent commodities and activities. This economic diversity has produced a rich
associational life in the department, composed of separate business organiza-
tions that aggregate the interests of different sectors. Chief among these organi-
zations are the Eastern Agricultural Chamber (Cámara Agropecuaria del
Oriente, or CAO), the Cattle Ranchers’ Federation (Federación de Ganaderos),
the Hydrocarbons Chamber (Cámara de Hidrocarburos), and the Chamber of
Industry and Commerce (Cámara de Industria y Comercio, or CAINCO). All of
these organizations are grouped together in an encompassing regional organiza-
tion called the Federation of Private Entrepreneurs of Bolivia–Santa Cruz
(Federación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia–Santa Cruz, or FEPB-SC). In
the past, conflicting interests and turf battles created distance between the con-
stituent members of the FEPB-SC. For example, the rise of soy farming in the
department produced conflict with cattle ranchers, and the financial crisis of
1998 and 1999 generated tension between banks and agricultural interests.84 In
the 1980s and ’90s, CAO and CAINCO waged a prolonged battle—ultimately
won by CAINCO—over which organization would play the leading role within
the FEPB-SC.85 Furthermore, the fact that each sectoral body was integrated
separately into its respective national organization (e.g., CAINCO within the
National Chamber of Industry and CAO within the National Chamber of
Agriculture) served to reinforce and reproduce divisions between sectors.
Divisions among business groups in Santa Cruz have dissipated with the
emergence of what these groups perceive to be more important and direct
threats to their common class interests.86 Two events are particularly noteworthy
because together, they have affected virtually all large-scale economic activity
in the department. The first concerns the failure to respect the (quite generous)
terms of the contracts that Bolivian presidents signed with foreign energy com-
panies in the late 1990s. These contracts were negotiated subsequent to the 1994
hydrocarbons law, which lowered taxes from 50 percent to 18 percent on
exports from new gas fields in the attempt to encourage gas exploration. In July
2004, in response to MAS pressure and over the opposition of the FEPB-SC,
Bolivian voters approved a referendum that instructed the government to take
greater control of the gas industry.87 Consequently, Congress passed a new
hydrocarbons law in May 2005 that returned the tax on new gas fields to 50 per-
cent and that unilaterally required gas companies to renegotiate their contracts
under the less advantageous terms of the new law.88 Led by the Hydrocarbons
86 POLITICS & SOCIETY
 © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on July 3, 2008 http://pas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Chamber, business groups in Santa Cruz argued that the new law was confiscatory
and certain to end foreign participation in the Bolivian natural gas industry, even
as MAS opposed the law because it did not nationalize the gas sector outright.89
Given that the highly liberal 1994 hydrocarbons law was just one of many eco-
nomic liberalization measures in the 1990s that benefited elites in Santa Cruz,
these elites saw the reversal of the hydrocarbons law as an ominous sign of
things to come.90
The second major threat that has galvanized the business class in Santa Cruz
and eclipsed the conflicts that divided the class in the past comes from the grow-
ing struggle over land reform and land titling. In 1996, in response to the mobi-
lization of lowland indigenous groups, Congress passed a new land reform law
that provided for the establishment of Originary Communal Lands (tierras
comunitarias de origen, or TCOs).91 According to this new law, plots larger than
fifty hectares (or 500 hectares, if owned by cattle ranchers) can be expropriated
and given to indigenous communities if they are not actively being used to pro-
duce tax revenue for the state.92 The question of whether land is being produc-
tively cultivated is decided by the National Agrarian Reform Institute (Instituto
Nacional de Reforma Agraria, or INRA), which business representatives accuse
of bias against nonindigenous large landholders and in favor of indigenous
claimants.93 As a reflection of this animosity, the INRA’s Santa Cruz office was
one of the buildings targeted in the December 2004 violence that broke out in
the run-up to the Second Great Open Tall Hall Meeting.94
In addition to the threat posed by TCOs, large agricultural producers and cat-
tle ranchers in Santa Cruz are also troubled by the emergence of the Landless
Movement (Movimiento sin Tierra, or MST).95 Modeled on the Brazilian orga-
nization with the same name, the MST spread into Santa Cruz subsequent to its
founding in the neighboring department of Tarija in 2000. In response to the
strengthening of the MST and the expropriation provisions established in the
1996 land reform legislation, landowners in Santa Cruz have increasingly orga-
nized paramilitary squads to defend their properties against land invasions.96
Subsequent to the fall of Sánchez de Losada in 2003, landowners in Santa Cruz
had cause to believe that the administration of Carlos Mesa was less willing to
defend large-scale agrobusinesses. In December 2004, for example, Mesa’s
appointed prefect in Santa Cruz, Hugo Carlos Molina, refused to use force to
dislodge the MST from a farm in the department.97 The rise of the MST in Santa
Cruz and the perception of lax law enforcement by the national government are
critical in understanding why business elites want departmental control not just
over natural resources and tax revenues but over police institutions as well.98
Faced with these threats to acquired property rights, business groups in Santa
Cruz have responded by unifying around a simple and yet radical set of
demands for autonomy over the department’s natural and productive resources.
One of the chief appeals of “autonomy” as a demand is that it can be tailored to
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meet the particular concerns of Santa Cruz’ different economic sectors, each of
which wants the chance to set policy independently of the national government.
Cattle ranchers, soy farmers, and companies that supply goods and services to
energy transnationals can all rally around autonomy as a common demand, even
if they would use autonomy in different ways in their respective spheres.
Although a strong consensus has clearly emerged among the department’s busi-
ness leaders in favor of autonomy as the end goal, it is important to note
that there are differences of opinion among them over the speed and level of
combativeness that will best achieve this goal.99 More significant, perhaps, is the
strengthening of separatist viewpoints among business leaders.100 Zvonko
Matkovic, for example, proposed “simply and smoothly” seceding from the
nation in his time as President of CAINCO.101 However, his successor as
CAINCO President, Gabriel Dabdoub, emphasizes that secession would be
profoundly destabilizing and that the autonomous control of Santa Cruz’
resources—within the existing borders of Bolivia—remains the overriding
goal.102 What seems likely is that, as Juan Carlos Urenda has warned, resistance
by the central government to the demand for autonomy is likely to deepen sup-
port for the even more radical option of separation from Bolivia.103
Breaking Ranks with the National Business Association
As sectoral business associations in Santa Cruz have united around a simple
and yet radical set of autonomy demands, they have also provoked a rupture
with their class counterparts in other parts of the country. Specifically, in early
2004, the FEPB-SC formally withdrew from Bolivia’s national, economy-wide
business association, the Confederation of Private Entrepreneurs of Bolivia
(Confederación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia, or CEPB).104 Composed
of both sectoral chambers (e.g., national chambers of industry, finance, and agri-
culture) and regional federations (e.g., the FEPB-SC and eight other depart-
mental federations), the CEPB has functioned in Bolivia as a powerful lobbyist
in both democratic and nondemocratic periods alike.105 In contrast to many other
Latin American countries, the comprehensive nature of the CEPB and its over-
lapping sectoral and geographic organization have consistently given business a
unified voice in the national government.106
At first glance, the decision of the FEPB-SC to withdraw from the CEPB
appears puzzling because it comes at a time when the mobilization of indige-
nous groups has put established elites on the defensive throughout Bolivia. Why
unify within the region as a class only to provoke the fragmentation of this class
within the nation along regional lines? In part, the answer has to do with the per-
ception among business groups in Santa Cruz that established economic elites
in La Paz and other western departments have not provided a more effective
defense of elite interests and have in fact largely withdrawn from political life.107
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Critics note, for example, that business groups play an important role in none of
the three separate civic committees that operate in the department of La Paz—
in contrast to Santa Cruz, where a cohesive business class dominates a single
and powerful civic committee (e.g., the CPSC).108 Not only have established
elites in the highlands failed to articulate a coherent political project, but these
elites have also been decimated by market reforms in the 1980s and ’90s that
shrank the size and role of the central state in Bolivia. Santa Cruz business elites
dismiss their counterparts in the west, who they believe prospered through the
extraction of resources from the state rather than through productive activi-
ties.109 In the wake of the decline of La Paz’ traditional elite, a new Aymara eco-
nomic elite has begun to emerge in cities such as El Alto and La Paz, but the
ethnicity of these elites, combined with their orientation toward commercial
rather than large-scale productive activities, tends to arouse the suspicion and
derision of Santa Cruz business groups.110
Within the CEPB, the official explanation for the departure of the FEBP-SC
from the national organization is that it withdrew when it was prevented from vot-
ing in the election of a new CEPB president. A closer look reveals a deeper set of
regional antagonisms, however. Specifically, the voting rights of the FEPB-SC
were denied because it failed to pay its membership dues, which it withheld to
protest the fact that its weight within the CEPB does not reflect its preponderant
weight within the national economy.111 For example, Santa Cruz’ industrial cham-
ber, CAINCO, is much more powerful than the national industrial chamber to
which it belongs, and yet in the current distribution of voting rights, it is forced to
participate within the national chamber (and thus, within the CEPB) as merely one
of nine departmental members.112 Additionally, the FEPB-SC loudly criticized the
decision by top CEPB representatives to meet with Evo Morales in October 2003
in the highly charged political environment that led to the ouster of Sánchez de
Losada.113 For all these reasons, separating from the national business association
(CEPB) played well “back home” in Santa Cruz because it enabled the depart-
ment’s business leaders to claim that they were protecting cruceños from disad-
vantageous events at the national level.114
Making Nonelite Allies within Santa Cruz
Closing ranks across sectors and asserting independence from Bolivia’s
national business class are two strategies that have helped Santa Cruz’ business
elites to reframe their personal and sectoral interests as territorial interests. But
a third strategy has also been critical in their struggle for autonomy. According
to this third strategy, business elites have adopted divide and conquer tactics
toward nonelites in the department, many of whom have offered strong support
for the highland indigenous mobilization against which these elites are reacting.
For example, on October 16, 2003, representatives of lowland indigenous
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groups unsuccessfully sought to demonstrate against the Sánchez de Losada
government in Santa Cruz, where they were brutally attacked by right-wing
youths affiliated with the CPSC.115 Acts of violence against these groups speak
to the threat posed by the possible forging of an alliance in Bolivia between its
highland and lowland indigenous populations.116 Although these acts of repres-
sion are not insignificant, the nonviolent courting of nonelites has been just as
important to the autonomy project that economic elites have conceptualized and
pursued in the department. In pursuing this strategy, the civic committee that
Santa Cruz’ business groups finance and direct (e.g., the CPSC) has emerged as
an important arena for the co-optation of nonelite allies, all in the attempt to bol-
ster the legitimacy of their more radical demands for autonomy. Against the
charge that they simply want autonomy to defend the concentration of wealth in
Santa Cruz, business groups can and do point to the CPSC’s nonelite constituent
groups as proof to the contrary.117
One case in point is Santa Cruz’ departmental labor federation (Central
Obrera Departmental, or COD), which is an affiliate of Bolivia’s corporatist
national labor confederation (Central Obrera Boliviana, or COB). Tensions
between the CPSC and the central government over regional autonomy have
provoked a deep split within the membership of the COD. While labor leaders
such as Lucio Vedia support Evo Morales and the central government, others
including Elio Pedraza, Gabriel Helbing, and Edwin Fernández argue that work-
ers in Santa Cruz have more in common with the CPSC than with the COB.118
For example, Elio Pedraza, who heads up the COD faction within the CPSC,
maintains that the COB’s historic orientation toward public-sector employees
squares poorly with the reality of Santa Cruz’ small public sector. In fact,
Pedraza argues that the COD should officially leave the COB, much as the
department’s business associations have left the CEPB.119 For Pedraza, the lack
of autonomy for Santa Cruz operates as a constraint on job growth in the depart-
ment. At another level, however, the allegiance of certain labor leaders to the
CPSC can be understood as an attempt to gain its support in leadership disputes
within the departmental labor movement. For example, in the aftermath of the
July 2006 autonomy referendum, the CPSC supported attempts by Edwin
Fernández to forcibly take control of the COD office in Santa Cruz from the
more left-leaning Lucio Vedia.120 The CPSC also supported the legislative cam-
paign of COD operative Gabriel Helbing, who successfully ran with the center-
right PODEMOS party in the December 2005 elections.121 Thus, personal
political interests as well as the belief that autonomy will translate into benefits
for Santa Cruz’ workforce explain why some labor leaders in the department are
willing to accept the overtures of the CPSC.
Divisions within Santa Cruz’ indigenous population have likewise created an
opening for the CPSC in its attempt to court nonelite allies. Many indigenous
political leaders criticize the CPSC for supporting autonomy for the department
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when it is at the same time resisting the autonomy claims of indigenous
communities within the department.122 One such politician is José Bailaba, who
parlayed his experience as a leader of the anti-CPSC indigenous group
Coordinadora de Pueblos Etnicos de Santa Cruz (CPESC) into a successful
campaign for Congress representing Evo Morales’ MAS party.123 Bailaba’s
CPESC was sharply critical of the CPSC for promising food and other benefits
to members of communities who agreed to travel to the city of Santa Cruz to
participate in a Special Assembly of the CPSC for the department’s indigenous
inhabitants. At the end of this Assembly on February 12, 2004, Bonifacio
Barrientos, a Guaraní leader from the province of Cordillera, was named
“Representative of the Indigenous Peoples of the Department to the CPSC.”124
Although Barrientos’ participation split the Guaraní population and led to
charges that he had betrayed his community,125 he and other indigenous leaders
have been attracted to the CPSC by the perks that it can offer and by the sup-
port it can deliver in political campaigns. After his elevation to the CPSC as its
top indigenous representative, for example, Barrientos used the committee’s
support to run for Congress in December 2005 as the candidate of three right-
of-center parties.126
The incorporation of nonelite groups and individuals is important because it
allows the CPSC to claim that it speaks for the department as a whole. Indeed,
one of the most distinctive patterns in the discourse of business leaders is their
insistence that all of civil society in Santa Cruz supports the CPSC’s proposals
for autonomy.127 The CPSC refers to itself as the “moral government of all
cruceños,” and as the ultimate arbiter of what it means to be cruceño (cruceñi-
dad).128 Given the considerable flows of migration from the highlands to Santa
Cruz, a major challenge for the CPSC has been to cultivate the support of
migrants who make up ever larger shares of the department’s population.129
According to the CPSC’s media coordinator, Daniel Castro, the committee has
made a conscious choice to strike a more inclusive tone by defining cruceños as
“vivientes en Santa Cruz” (e.g., those who live in Santa Cruz) rather than “naci-
dos en Santa Cruz” (e.g., those who were born in Santa Cruz).130 The CPSC has
also sought to bolster its demands for autonomy by using language that con-
trasts the divisive and conflictual politics of Bolivia Bloqueadora (Blockading
Bolivia) in the west with the myth of Bolivia Pacífica (Peaceful Bolivia) in the
east.131 Even more important is the existence of a word, camba or “lowlander,”
which conveniently refers to all lowland Bolivians independent of their ethnic,
linguistic, or socioeconomic status. Camba is a very useful term for those who
wish to emphasize the common interests of all of Santa Cruz’ residents against
the interests of “collas” or “highlanders” in the west. Because camba and colla
are territorial rather than ethnic markers, this enables the groups that dominate
the CPSC to portray Santa Cruz as the victim of collas, and thereby to refrain
from explicitly anti-indigenous rhetoric.
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Despite the fact that the CPSC can point to nonelite allies and despite the fact
that 71 percent of voters in Santa Cruz approved a general statement in favor of
autonomy in the July 2006 referendum, the reality is that autonomy over the
department’s resources would reinforce the control of its most powerful sectors
over its least powerful inhabitants. According to the Catholic Church, one of the
country’s few institutions that has not divided along regional lines, centralism is
a problem in Bolivia, but autonomy in the absence of propoor reforms is no
solution.132 For several reasons, it is unlikely that an extensive grant of auton-
omy to Santa Cruz would then be followed up with reforms designed to divide
and distribute power broadly within the department. First is the hostility on
the part of the CPSC to lower levels of government within the department. The
CPSC, for example, has advocated the elimination of provincial units within
the department.133 Second is the extent of the internal divisions in the labor
movement that are described above, which limit the ability of nonelite actors to
push for redistributive changes within the department. Autonomy would simply
make it harder for advocates of structural reform within any one department to
leverage the support of allies in other departments. Third is the strength within
the department of the same conservative parties that have been devastated at the
national level by their poor performance in the 2002 and 2005 elections. As a
result of the 2005 elections, for example, legislators from right-of-center parties
hold 68 percent of Santa Cruz’ seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 66 percent
in the Senate. Combined with the perceived hostility of the CPSC to decentral-
ization within the department, the strength of conservative parties and the weak-
ness of the labor movement help explain why nonelite groups in Santa Cruz fear
that autonomy will disproportionately benefit the elite groups who have pushed
for it so aggressively.
CONCLUSION: UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS DOES
THE AUTONOMISTA BACKLASH OCCUR?
According to the argument advanced in this article, it is no coincidence that
qualitatively new demands for autonomy in Santa Cruz have emerged in the
wake of qualitatively new forms of political influence by Bolivia’s indigenous
population. This population mobilized in the 1990s to claim new roles as pro-
tagonists in the country’s political life, and in the process, directly challenged
the special access that economic elites previously enjoyed in national political
institutions. For decades, highly centralized political institutions were no
impediment to the interests of Santa Cruz–based elites, who received a dispro-
portionate share of state-mediated investments and benefits during Bolivia’s
decades-long experience with state capitalism. But business groups in Santa
Cruz quickly updated their institutional preferences and articulated a sweeping
demand for regional autonomy in response to a set of changes that have brought
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indigenous Bolivians to power. Specifically, when it became clear that indige-
nous actors had permeated the only two levels of government that wield real
governing authority in Bolivia—the municipal and national levels—economic
elites in Santa Cruz began to push aggressively for changes that would expand
the intermediate level of government where they hold sway. Having lost voice
because of changes that appear unlikely to be reversed any time soon, economic
elites in Santa Cruz now seek exit, with exit defined not as separation but as
autonomy from a national government in which they have lost influence.
In an earlier period, the demand for authoritarianism rather than autonomy
would have been the likely response of economic elites to such a loss of politi-
cal voice. Indeed, in 1964, Santa Cruz elites supported Barrientos’ military coup
against the MNR, and in 1971, they supported the Banzer coup against one of
the more left-leaning generals who had succeeded Barrientos in the presidency.
The disastrous experience with military rule in Bolivia and elsewhere, however,
along with a much altered international environment, have significantly reduced
the feasibility of the authoritarian option that was favored by earlier generations
of business elites.
Considering how dim the prospects are for outright authoritarian reversals in
Latin America today, regional autonomy is a potentially attractive option for
economic elites who feel threatened by indigenous mobilization. And yet there
are good reasons to believe that the conditions for the emergence of an autono-
mista backlash are much more propitious in Bolivia than elsewhere in the con-
tinent. Based on my analysis of the Bolivian case, the following paragraphs
summarize the three critical conditions that have facilitated the autonomy back-
lash in Santa Cruz but that may not be in place in other countries in which new
forms of indigenous mobilization are occurring.
The first condition is the extent to which economic and political power over-
lap territorially. In Bolivia, one of the most important factors that enabled busi-
ness elites to adopt autonomy as their core demand is the significant dislocation
that exists in the country between the site of economic power and political
authority. Economic resources are concentrated in Santa Cruz in two senses.
First, the bulk of the country’s natural and productive resources are concentrated
in this one subnational region. Second, the ownership of these assets within the
department is heavily concentrated among a relatively small group of large busi-
nesses, which makes it easier for them to organize in defense of their common
interests. In contrast to the economic power that is concentrated in Santa Cruz,
the department’s formal political authority has been constrained by a constitu-
tion that denies departments the right to elect their own authorities and that
assigns enormous policy-making authority to the national government.
Although this national government was moved to La Paz as a result of that
department’s economic dynamism in the late nineteenth century, La Paz is no
longer an economically vibrant region. In Latin America, only Ecuador—with
KENT EATON 93
 © 2007 SAGE Publications. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at UNIV OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ on July 3, 2008 http://pas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
its struggle between the productive economy of Guayaquil on the coast and the
national capital of Quito in the sierra—appears to approximate the disconnec-
tion that has developed in the Bolivian case. In other countries (e.g., Peru), eco-
nomic elites may lament the growing national influence of indigenous actors,
but if these elites’ assets are concentrated in the area surrounding the national
capital (e.g., Lima), then regional autonomy would do them little good.
The salience of antimarket positions within the mobilizing strategies that
indigenous leaders adopt is a second condition that helps explain the likelihood
of an autonomista backlash. In Bolivia, Evo Morales successfully channeled
deep frustration with the social costs of neoliberalism, borne disproportionately
by the indigenous population, and with the reality that market-oriented policies
had stabilized the macroeconomy without creating a more prosperous country.
That Morales questioned the role played by foreign investors in the Bolivian
economy was especially troubling in Santa Cruz because the domestic busi-
nesses with which transnational corporations have partnered in Bolivia are
largely based in that department. To date, virtually all indigenous leaders in
Latin America have articulated a similar stance against the market and against
neoliberalism.134 Since it is impossible to observe how elites respond to the
mobilization of indigenous leaders who are not particularly critical of neoliber-
alism, this variable currently gives us little purchase on possible forms of vari-
ation in the emergence of conservative autonomy movements. Once indigenous
leaders begin to exercise significant governing roles in Latin America, however,
they may well moderate their antimarket rhetoric, as so many of their left-lean-
ing but nonindigenous predecessors have done in the recent past. Such a devel-
opment would then make it possible in the future to evaluate the relative
importance of this particular variable.
The strength of the national political parties that represent elite interests is
the third critical factor established elites consider in determining how to respond
to indigenous mobilization. This calculation is analogous to the phenomenon
that Edward Gibson has documented in Latin America’s past: where effective
conservative parties did not exist, business elites supported the installation of
authoritarian forms of government much more frequently than where such par-
ties did exist.135 According to this line of analysis, the electoral successes of the
MAS in Bolivia were threatening to elites in Santa Cruz not just because they
gave political voice to indigenous actors who wanted to roll back market
reforms. They were also threatening because their gains came at the expense of
the three parties that had monopolized control over the national government in
the 1980s and ’90s and that had introduced and defended economic liberaliza-
tion. The increasingly anemic performance of these parties put into serious
doubt the possibility that economic elites could secure a minimally acceptable
degree of influence in the national government.
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The contrast with Ecuador is again instructive. In neither Guayaquil nor
Santa Cruz can economic elites currently count on strong national parties to rep-
resent their interests in, respectively, Quito and La Paz. Yet, whereas the Social
Christian Party that Guayaquil elites favor has always been an essentially
regional party, in Santa Cruz, elites could previously count on several party
options (e.g., ADN, MIR, MNR), all of them organized nationally. In this con-
text, the more concerted push for autonomy in Bolivia may be explained as the
result of the sudden disappearance of a national political tool that had proved to
be so useful in the past.
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